Term Structure of Debt and Entrepreneurial Behavior: Experimental Evidence from Microfinance

Financiers across the world structure debt contracts to limit the risk of entrepreneurial lending. However, certain debt structures that reduce risk may inhibit enterprise growth, especially among the poor. We use a field experiment to estimate the short- and long-run impacts of varying the term structure of the classic microfinance loan product. While the classic microfinance loan contract requires clients to make small and frequent repayment installments beginning immediately after loan disbursement, clients in our treatment group instead received a two-month grace period before repay- ment began. The shift to a grace period contract increased clients' business investments in the short run and profits and income in the long run, but also their rate of default, indicating a shift towards investments with higher average but also more variable re- turns. In this manner, the absence of a grace period reduces risk but also the potential impact of microfinance on microenterprise growth and household poverty.

Field et al (2010)


UnknownRCTGroup liability credit. Tested the benefit of using a grace period for loans instead of starting repayment immediately.Positive impact of grace period on businesses of some women. Women with grace period invested 6% more of loans in businesses than those with no grace period. After two years, women with grace period increased average profits by 30%. 19% of women with a grace period group defaulted on loans, (compared to 2% default rate among women with standard repayment).http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/field/files/repayment_default_dec19-1.pdfPoor microentrepreneurs and wage workers (75% have home-based business).